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up the potential to link people around the globe, crossing international and cultural boundaries. Americans leveraged the new capability to such a great extent that it has been woven into the fabric of our society, which also provides an avenue for our adversaries to exploit. With such grave concern over potential attacks within the complex cyber environment, which department is responsible to protect United States interests? Presidential Directives have designated the Department of Homeland Security as a government lead while the Department of Defense also has a key role in cyber. In reviewing authorities of each organization and within the context of other contributors to the protection of U.S. interests there is minimal overlap between the two organizations. Current laws limit the potential defense while also not clearly designating roles and responsibilities, while the threat continues to increase.
Who is Responsible for Defending United States Interests in Cyberspace?
A Cyber attack perpetrated by nation states or violent extremist groups could be as destructive as the terrorist attack of 9//11. Such a destructive cyber terrorist attack could paralyze the nation.
-Secretary Leon Panetta
As a nation, the United States of America created the Internet, embraced it, and opened up the potential to link people around the globe, crossing international and cultural boundaries. Americans leveraged the new capability to such a great extent that it has been woven into the fabric of our society, which also provides an avenue for our adversaries to exploit. With such grave concern and potential damage from a cyber attack where has the United States placed the authority and responsibility to protect our …the Secretary shall lead the national effort to protect, defend, and reduce vulnerabilities of Federal systems (excluding civilian national security systems), and shall provide consolidated intrusion detection, incident analysis, and cyber response capabilities to protect Federal agencies' external access points. 1 However, the specific legal authorities, which would enable DHS to execute the cyber mission, are still unclear based on their own internal analysis. 2 There are numerous definitions of what is a National Security System depending on the source so the following definition is provided.
400 USC § 11103 defines National Security Systems as telecommunications or information system operated by the federal government with the following function, operation or use which involves intelligence, cryptologic activities related to national security, involves command and control of military forces, equipment integral as a part of a weapon system, or is critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions. 3 As with new systems and technology, common understanding and definitions are not always apparent. The White House National Security Council provides the following definition of cyberspace from their "Cyberspace Policy Review."
Cyberspace is defined as the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, and includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers in critical industries. 4 On June 23, 2009 , then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates directed U.S. Cyber
Command be established to defend the department's networks as well as provide freedom of action in cyberspace. 5 The challenge in the man-made domain of cyber is that of identifying the threat, delineating intent, and then taking action across a generally unregulated space that crosses sovereign national boundaries. Unfortunately the military and government as a whole do not own the vast majority of the networks they currently use today. These open-ended and immature policies concerning banking, private sector communications and infrastructure were mentioned by the Commander of Strategic Command in his congressional testimony of the requirement to "clarify the global roles, responsibilities, expectations, and authorities that contribute to a stable and effective deterrence and assurance" in the cyber domain.
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Environmental Challenges
With over 116,000 reported cyber incidents to DHS last year alone, the trend continues to increase in both volume and complexity. 7 Those are only the incidents actually reported to DHS. The ability and low entry cost into the cyber domain increases the number of players from nation-state actors, criminals, terrorists, and random hackers attempting to make a public statement or exploit vulnerabilities. With 3 the challenge of attribution in cyberspace, how does the U.S. government classify cyber activities as either threats to national security or law enforcement issues? Cyber intertwines real and virtual personas, embedding personal identifiable information into electronic communications that make protection of cyber unique when compared to other domains such as the sea. Cyber has been in existence for roughly three decades as opposed to the Law of the Sea that took over 300 years to develop and reach consensus by the international community.
Complexity and Definition of the Threat
Knowing what originated the malicious activity on a specific network, as well as when the incident actually began on a specific target, can be challenging at best depending on the intent of the attacker. Cyber disruptions in our modern world have become even more critical as our nation's dependence on the network and maintaining connectivity continues to increase. Furthermore, social/political movements or groups such as "Anonymous" include many groups of individuals from "teenagers to anarchists"
as "anyone can engage in a malicious act and claim it "Anonymous." 8 Attribution is a key component as the U.S. must be able to quickly see the threat to allow a "calibrated and calculated response", a significant challenge in this environment. 9 Cyberspace has no physical boundaries and is constantly changing, which challenges any efforts to defend this domain. 10 Cyber activity may employ similar techniques to either exploit or attack a network to achieve an effect or purpose. With many common traits in cyber events, it can be challenging to determine if the response should originate from law enforcement or defense officials. Theft, exploitation, publicity, espionage, and damage are only a few of the possible motives for a malicious cyber activity. So with a complex environment, how might we delineate the spectrum of cyber disruptions, which The Nature of the Targets
The DHS Strategy for the physical defense of critical infrastructure defines 13 key sectors and five additional key assets, which run the spectrum from agriculture to shipping to nuclear power plants. 15 All of these sectors are dependent on cyber, and therefore also potentially vulnerable to network disruption and attack. 
Stakeholders in Cyber
As cyber touches all the physical environments of air, space, land, and sea it also crosses political, cultural, and national boundaries. Just from the U.S. perspective, and leaving the international community separate, there are competing interests and ideas as to how best secure cyber. All levels of government from the U.S. Federal government to the local communities all rely on cyber to provide for their citizens.
Private and public partnerships pervade as everyone is potentially enabled or disrupted in cyberspace. Retail, manufacturing, and shipping industries depend on reliable and secure access to cyberspace supported by infrastructure enabled through the access to the virtual highways. General Keith B. Alexander, Commander of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) described the U.S.'s overall preparation for a cyber threat as a "3 out of 10." 21 He went on to address specific issues such as the speed of detection and associated response, shortfalls in standards. 22 The key issue he identified was the unresolved issue of private/public information sharing about the threats. The Homeland Security Act created DHS from an amalgamation of 23 separate federal agencies and also provided applicable authorities. 6 USC §112 empowers DHS to work with federal laboratories to identify the "best available technologies for homeland security mission" and also "promote" and "develop public-private partnerships." 33 DHS also is tasked to "develop a comprehensive national plan for securing the key resources and critical infrastructure" to include the elements of cyber as it impacts banking, communications, and power production. 34 Another key authority provided to DHS supports information sharing of both law enforcement and intelligence information across all levels of government and the private sector with concern to homeland security. 35 Specific to cybersecurity, this key public law enables DHS to share "analysis and warnings related to threats to, and vulnerabilities of, critical information systems" and for DHS to develop a "national technology guard' which links In the broadest application, the President directed a policy to define "key and critical resources" with the intent to protect them from attacks by terrorist incidents.
HSPD-7 identifies DHS as "responsible for coordinating the overall national effort to enhance the protection of the critical infrastructures and key resources of the United States". 44 With respect to cyber, HSPD-7 specifies "The (DHS) Secretary will continue to maintain an organization to serve as a focal point for the security of cyberspace." infrastructure. 48 The key components of this directive were the authorization of DHS as the lead to establish standards for the agencies of the executive branch while coordinating with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 49 Furthermore, under already established authorities such as HSPD-7, DHS serves as the lead for critical infrastructure to prevent degradation and damage across cyberspace. This authority was expanded in NSPD-54/HSPD-23 as it codified the already published
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI). A key addition with this directive was the guidance for DHS to advance private and public efforts in the defense of the nation's key and critical infrastructure within the realm of cyber. 50 While the guidance allows DHS to work public/private partnerships it does not have the authority to legally protect private organizations and companies from lawsuits if they choose to share data on cyber disruptions and threats with the federal government. Legislation is needed to provide the construct and protection to private organizations that in early 2013 has still not been resolved by Congress. 51 This lack of legal protection undercuts this Presidential initiative and guidance provided to DHS.
Presidential Executive Order (February 2013) Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity
President Barack Obama updated the U.S. Policy to ensure that the country improves the "security and resilience of the Nation's critical infrastructure and to maintain a cyber environment that encourages efficiency." 52 Key directives on policy 14 development of information sharing both unclassified and classified cyber reports were included with the Attorney General, DHS, and Director of National Intelligence coordinating this effort. 53 The President goes on to encourage additional voluntary participation by critical infrastructure in the Enhanced Cybersecurity Services Program. 54 Without additional congressional action, there can be no requirement for owners of critical infrastructure to participate in the program. The U.S. Secret Service was given primary investigative authority over fraud cases to include those involving computers. 55 The 1984 Act classified unauthorized access to computers as a federal crime. This included certain categories such as national security information, banking and credit, and information accessed from a "protected computer". "A protected computer is one used by or for a financial institution, the federal government, or one used in interstate or foreign commerce and communication." 56 These laws classify most of the potential cyberspace actions from introduction of malware, exploitation, theft, and destruction as a federal crime.
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
NIST is a non-regulatory directorate under the Secretary of Commerce who provides standards, technology, and scientific research with the goal of increasing the U.S. economic security and increasing our national quality of life. 57 Authorities enabling NIST to create standards and guidelines come from several key legal documents. Even in this potential solution, critical networks serving the defense of the nation controlled by DCI and DoD would be excluded from DHS authority, so there would still 22 be at least two distinct organizations protecting the government's networks. A structural challenge to a hierarchical response to a network challenge is that the bureaucracy could not keep up with the potential threats.
Open Strategy
As there are more stakeholders within cyber than can be named, perhaps a better position is to identify that everyone has a role in defending the national interests in cyber. For instance The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative includes an effort to link all of the appropriate cyber current operations centers to gain a common understanding of the environment. 82 Specific legal authorities must be clarified and spelled out in new legislation as there has been no substantive cyber legislation since
2002. In view of a central oversight and deconfliction authority, DHS could chair the whole of government action at this strategic level without impending on others.
Legislation should allow sharing at the lowest levels between industry and government through computer to computer communications to stop threats to U.S. interests without concern of potential lawsuits. In this way, a public company could freely share details of ongoing disruptions with NSA without working through a middleman at DHS, as is the current structure because of limitations on DoD. Key participants such as DoD, DHS, and FBI would generally maintain the traditional lines of responsibility, but in a collaborative environment. Access to information, as well as action to stop an incident may come from law enforcement or defense organizations in an active defense scenario. As both nationally sponsored threats and private hackers intend to disrupt and attack U.S. interests, stopping the disruption as quickly as possible is the central issue. As mentioned previously, attribution can be challenging at best. Appropriate action could be taken to stop the hostile action without clearly identifying the what or who originated the threat. In a more network-based response, the potential threat would be unaware of who was countering their attack; DoD, FBI, or private network administrators. Our adversaries know the very public limitations placed on DoD, so they can operate without worry of intervention by the military Broadening DoD's authorities in concert with DHS, and networking all the U.S. governments' capabilities has the potential to create unknowns for all adversaries as the U.S. government has even reserved kinetic responses to potential cyber threats. In those specific cases it would be a DoD response, but maintaining a level of ambiguity keeps all options on the table.
Recommendation
The breadth of the problem and complexity of the environment demands that not one organization bears the entire responsibility for protecting all U.S. interests in cyber, 
